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This  paper  examines  the  sharp  rise  in  bond  yield  volatility  across  the 
major  bond  markets  in  1994. The  analysis  covers  thirteen  industrialised 
countries  and  is  largely  based  on  OTC  data  for  implied  bond  yield 
volatility.  We conclude  that  the  market’s own  dynamics  seem  to provide 
a  stronger  explanation  than  variations  in  market  participants’ 
apprehensions  about  economic  fundamentals.  We  identify  three  market 
dynamics:  downward  markets  increase  volatility;  volatility  spills  over 
from  certain  markets  onto  others;  and  it  can  rise  in  the  wake  of 
substantial  withdrawals  of  foreign  investments.  We  find  more  limited 
evidence  that  monetary  or  fiscal  policies  accounted  for  the  rise  in 
volatility,  at  least  by  our  measures.  Moreover,  changing  expectations 
about  growth  and inflation,  while  perhaps  at work in particular  countries, 
do not offer much  of a general  explanation. Introduction* 
The bond  market  sell-off  of  1994 has begun  to show  up on lists  of market  events  against 
which  risk management  systems  are judged.  One  such  list  includes  the  1987 stock  market  crash,  the 
1990  Gulf  war,  the  1992  European  exchange  rate  mechanism  turbulence,  the  1994  bond  market 
decline  and the  1995 Kobe earthquake  (Market  Risk Task Force,  1995). 
In contrast  to the  1987 stock market  crash, however,  our understanding  of the  1994 bond 
market  decline  has  not  benefited  from  a  series  of  official  post-mortems  and  from  subsequent 
published  studies.  This paper  steps into this lacuna  and asks why  volatility  rose  across the major  bond 
markets  in  1994,  with  increases  ranging  from  5 percentage  points  in  the  US  market  to  10 or  more 
elsewhere.’  The  analysis  covers  thirteen  industrialised  countries2  and  is  largely,  though  not 
exclusively,  based  on OTC data for implied  bond  yield  volatility  (see Box  for more  details). 
The  market’s own  dynamics  seem  to provide  a stronger  answer  than variations  in market 
participants’  apprehensions  about  economic  fundamentals.  We  identify  three  market  dynamics: 
downward  markets  increase  volatility;  volatility  spills  over  from  certain  markets  onto  others;  and  it 
can rise in the wake of substantial  withdrawals  of foreign  investments.  We find more  limited  evidence 
that  monetary  or fiscal  policies  accounted  for the  rise  in volatility  in  1994, at least  by  our  measures. 
Moreover,  changing  expectations  about  growth  and  inflation,  while  perhaps  at  work  in  particular 
countries,  do not offer much  of a general  explanation. 
I. The events 
Volatility  rose  sharply  in  the  world’s  major  bond  markets  last  year,  accompanying  the 
early  stages  of a bear bond  market  (Graph  1). Volatility  generally  began  to increase  in February,  soon 
after the tightening  of monetary  policy  in the United  States.  The main  exception  was Japan,  where the 
rise started in January. 
The  scale and persistence  of the increase  were not  uniform  across  countries.  Measured  by 
the  standard  deviation  of daily  percentage  changes  over  a sliding  three-month  window,  the  rise  was 
comparatively  modest  and short-lived  in the United  States and especially  large and persistent  in ERM 
countries.  In Europe,  volatility  generally  peaked  in mid-year,  about one month  later than  in the United 
States and a whole  quarter behind  Japan. 
The  overall  picture  is broadly  similar  when  gauged  by  the  movements  of  the  implied 
volatility  of  three-month  over-the-counter  at-the-money  option  contracts  on  ten-year  benchmark 
*  We would like to thank Hemi Bernard, Angelika Donaubauer and Gert Schnabel for statistical assistance, 
Wilhelm Fritz for technical help and Stephan Arthur for preparing the graphs. 
1  This  report  is a particular  application  of  the  fmdings  presented  in our  longer  paper,  “The  economics  of 
recent  bond yield  volatility”.  The interested  reader  is referred  to that paper  for a more  detailed  treatment  of 
the points  distilled  here. 
2  The  United  States,  Japan,  Germany,  France,  the  United  Kingdom, Italy,  Canada, Australia, Belgium, 
Denmark,  the Netherlands.  Spain and Sweden. 
3 government  bonds,  the  main  focus  of  this  paper  (same  graph,  top  six  panels).  The  main  difference  is 
that  the  increase  in volatility  in the  US  market  looks  smaller. 
Box  - The data 
Much  of  the  present  research  draws  on  a  database  of  weekly  yield  volatility  for  three- 
month  at-the-money  over-the-counter  options  on  ten-year  benchmark  government  bonds  in thirteen 
major  markets  as quoted  at the  market  close  on  Thursdays  by  a leading  market-maker,  J.P.  Morgan 
(Watts,  1994  and  1995).  Supply  and  demand  in the  market  for  options  set  the  premium  price;  and 
this  price,  together  with  interest  rates,  can  be  used  to  back  out  an  implied  volatility  through  an 
option  pricing  formuIa.  Admittedly,  market-makers’  methods  for  mapping  premium  prices  into  and 
out  of  implied  volatilities  vary  somewhat  across  firms  and  over  time.  However,  the  difference 
between  these  pricing  models  are  subtle  enough  for  market-makers  to  find  it  convenient  to  quote 
their  options  in terms  of the implied  volatilities. 
OTC  market  quotations  have  a  number  of  advantages  over  volatilities  embodied  in  the 
prices  of  exchange-traded  options.  They  exist  for  government  bonds  that  are  not  exchange-traded. 
And  they  are  quoted  for  the  same  maturity  at  every  observation.  By  contrast,  exchange-traded 
contracts  exist  only  at monthly  or  longer  intervals.  Successive  quotations  on the  same  contract  thus 
differ  if  implied  volatility  varies  across  contracts  with  different  maturities.  While  interpolating 
techniques  have  been  developed  to deal  with  this  problem,  the  constant-maturity  aspect  of the  over- 
the-counter  quotations  avoids  it altogether. 
Relying  on over-the-counter  quotations  for  implied  volatility  from  a single  market-maker 
raises  questions  regarding  the  reliability  (or  what  might  be  called  the  intersubjective  truth)  of  the 
data.  At the  outset,  recall  that  financial  markets  have  confronted  this  problem  in the  past.  The  most 
famous  example  is the London  Interbank  Offered  Rate  (LIBOR)  for  bank  deposits,  which,  just  as an 
OTC  option  contract,  can  expose  the  buyer  to  the  selling  bank’s  credit  risk.  Big  syndicated  loan 
contracts  with  interest  rates  tied  to  LIBOR  will  typically  specify  the  five  leading  banks  whose 
quotations  are  to be averaged.  The  difference  between  an unquestioned  acceptance  of  LIBOR  and 
of  our  OTC  quotations  thus  reduces  from  the  principle  of  using  over-the-counter  prices  to  the 
practical  question  of whether  one  can  rely  on one  dealer’s  prices. 
Those  in charge  of  monitoring  the  accuracy  of  a  dealer’s  valuation  of  its  book  typically 
use  quotations  of  competitors  as a benchmark.  It is therefore  natural  to do  the  same  in our  case.  A 
comparison  of  the  J.P.  Morgan  quotations  with  scattered  ones  from  Hong  Kong  Banking 
Corporation’s  London  affiliate  (Midland  Montague)  was reassuring.  Given  differences  in the  timing 
of  the  quotations  and  the  need  to  convert  price  into  yield  volatility  through  a  standard 
approximation,  the remaining  small  discrepancies  indicated  that  the  J.P.  Morgan  quotations  were  a 
satisfactory  basis  for the  analysis.  (See  Borio  and McCauley,  1995, for details). 
A final  issue  is the  choice  between  price  and yield  volatility.  Price  volatility  is the  most 
useful  measure  of the variability  of  holding  period  returns.  It would  therefore  be the  natural  choice 
in  the  context,  say,  of  “value-at-risk”  models.  But  when  it  comes  to  making  international 
comparisons  of volatility  levels,  yield  volatility  appears  to be more  appropriate.  The  reason  is that  it 
controls  for differences  in the duration  of the bonds  linked  to differences  in nominal  yield  levels  and 
cash-flow  profiles.  This  is also useful  in longer-term  time  series  when  the benchmark  bonds  change. 
As  an  illustration,  consider  the  comparison  between  the  benchmark  US  Treasury  bond 
and  its Swedish  counterpart  in mid-September  1995.  The  US security  had  a coupon  of  6.5 per  cent, 
the  Swedish  instrument  one  of  6.0%.  Since  krona  yields  exceeded  dollar  yields  by  a sizable  margin, 
the  Swedish  bond  sold  at a heavy  discount;  the  US  security,  by  contrast,  traded  close  to  par.  As  a 
result  of the  deep  discount,  the  Swedish  bond  approached  the long  duration  of  a zero  coupon  bond. 
Measured  in  terms  of  yield,  the  implied  volatility  of  the  US  security  was  higher,  18.2%  against 
16.5%.  In terms  of  price  volatility,  however,  the  Swedish  bond  appeared  to  be  considerably  more 
volatile,  10.3%  against  8.2%. 
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t Historical  volatility  is measured  as the  annualised  standard  deviation  of daily  percentage  changes  in bond  yields  calculated 
over  the  preceding  ninety-one  calendar  days.  2 Yield  volatility  implied  in three-month  over-the-counter,  at-the-money 
option  contracts  on ten-year  benchmark  government  bonds,  plotted  at the time  the contract  is struck.  3 Expected  volatility  is 
implied  volatility  plotted  at the time  the contract  expires  so as to be aligned  with  historical  volatility  (e.g.  the  point  in December 
is equal  to the  difference  between  historical  volatility  as plotted  in December  and implied  volatility  as plotted  in September). 
Sources:  Datastream,  J. P. Morgan  and  national  data. 
5 If implied  volatility  measures  market  expectations  about realised  volatility  during  the life 
of  the  option’s  contract,  the  evidence  indicates  two  surprises  in  1994: participants  initially  failed  to 
anticipate  the  turbulence  and  subsequently  overestimated  its  persistence  (same  graph,  bottom  two 
panels).  This  pattern,  uniform  across  countries,  suggests  that  implied  volatility  is firmly  anchored  to 
the behaviour  of historical  volatility  in the proximate  past. 
A look  at the  rise  in  volatility  from  a longer-term  perspective  highlights  both  the  scale 
and  the  unusual  international  incidence  of  the  increase  (Graph  2).  Last  year’s rise  appears  to be  the 
third  such  global  episode  since  the beginning  of the  1980s. The  first two  took  place,  respectively,  in 
the  early  1980s and around  the  stock  market  crash of  1987. In  1994 volatility  reached  close  to record 
highs  and  persistence  in  some  of  the  countries  with  the  lowest  interest  rates  and  better  inflation 
records,  such  as  Germany  and  the  Netherlands.  In  Europe,  it  also  typically  exceeded  the  levels 
observed  at the time  of the ERM turbulence  in 1992 and  1993. 
II. The possible explanations: market dynamics 
1.  Persistence 
The  most  powerful  feature  of  the  dynamics  of  volatility  is  its  tendency  to  persist  over 
time,  that is, to revert  to its mean  only  gradually.  This  feature  obviously  leaves  open  the question  of 
the force  or forces that drive volatility  up in the first place  and thus  cannot  explain  the events  of  1994. 
Nevertheless,  since  an econometric  evaluation  of any other  factor  must  take  persistence  into  account, 
we  report  in  Table  1 the  relationship  between  implied  bond  volatility  in  two  successive  weeks  as 
Table 1 
Persistence  of implied bond yield volatility’ 
Persistence 
parameter2 
x2  Sample  begins  on3 
United  States  ........................... 
Japan  ...................................... 
Germany  ................................. 
France  ..................................... 
United  Kingdom  ....................... 
Italy  .......................................... 
Canada  .................................... 
Belgium  ................................... 
Netherlands  ............................. 
Spain  ....................................... 
Denmark  .................................. 
Sweden  ................................... 
Australia  ................................... 
0.90’*  0.81  31.08.92 
0.93’”  0.87  31.08.92 
0.96’”  0.93  31.08.92 
0.90’”  0.81  31 sI8.92 
0.96’*  0.92  31.08.92 
0.84**  0.73  31.08.92 
0.95’*  0.90  31.08.92 
0.94**  0.90  31.08.92 
0.97’”  0.94  31.08.92 
0.77’*  0.58  16.11.92 
0.92’*  0.83  14.02.94 
0.94”’  0.89  14.02.94 
0.88’”  0.77  21.03.94 
Note:  In this  and subsequent  tables  and graphs,  one, two  and three  asterisks  denote  statistical  significance 
at the  10, 5 and  1% level respectively. 
1  Yield  volatility  implied  in  three-month  over-the-counter  at-the-money  option  contracts  on  ten-year 
benchmark  government  bonds.  2  Autoregressive  parameter  of  AR(l)  process  estimated  by  OLS  on 
weekly  data.  3  The  sample  ends  on 22.0595  for all countries. captured  by the autoregressive  coefficient.  The power  of this dynamic  factor is evident:  it accounts  for 
anything  as much  as 58 to 93% of the variance  of volatility. 
Graph 2 
Bond yield volatility:  a longer-term  perspective 
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Note: Volatility  is measured  as the  annuaiised  standard  deviation  of daily percentage  changes  during  calendar  months  in the 
yield  on ten-year  benchmark  government  bonds. The shaded (unshaded)  areas represent  bear (bull)  markets  and the horizontal 
lines  the average  volatility  during  these periods. 
Sources:  Datastream  and national  data. 2.  impact  of market movements 
The twenty-year-old  observation  (Black,  1976; Hentschel,  1995) that price  declines  in the 
stock  market  are associated  with  higher  volatility  applied  with particular  force  to the  1987 crash.  For 
the  1994 bond  market  decline,  we find strong  but by not ubiquitous  evidence  that a rise in bond  yields 
over  a week  pushed  implied  bond  volatility  at the end  of that week  higher  (Graph  3). For eight  of the 
thirteen  countries,  volatility  appears  directional  in our sample period:  it rises  in response  to declines  in 
bond  prices  but  fails to respond  significantly  to equivalent  increases.  The  data  suggest  that the United 
States  and  Canada  are exceptions  in that  implied  volatility  does  not  react  at all to proximate  market 
movements.  Also,  in Japan,  Sweden  and  Spain  the response  appears  to be symmetrical:  increases  and 
decreases  in  yields  have  a similar  effect.  The  fairly precisely  estimated  magnitude  of  the  effect  of  a 
market  move  is substantial;  its one-third  to one-half  range  suggests  that  a rise  in long  rates  from  6 to 
7% -  a 16% increase  -  might  raise volatility  by 5 to 8 percentage  points. 
For Japan we hypothesise  that two deflationary  developments,  the  appreciation  of the yen 
in  early  1994  and  again  in  early  1995,  destabilised  the  bond  market  (and  the  money  market,  see 
below),  These  exchange  rate movements  would  work  to change  expectations  of the price  level and set 
in train market  anticipations  of changes  in short-term  interest  rates and in fiscal policy. 
Our short period  analysis  of implied  volatility  finds reinforcement  in a longer  view  of the 
behaviour  of  realised  volatility  (Loeys,  1994). In  Graph  2 the  shaded  bear  market  periods  appear  to 
experience  higher  volatility  as a general  rule.  Thus,  in the German  market,  for example,  recent  events 
echo  those  during  two  previous  bear  markets:  at  the  onset  of  German  reunification  and  at  the 
wearing-off  of the euphoria  of the  1986 oil price  collapse. 
It  is  difficult  to  say  what  lies  behind  the  apparent  directionality  of  volatility.  Several 
potential  explanations  can  be put  forward.  These  include  asymmetries  in  inflation  risks  (Friedman, 
1977),  in  the  ability  and  willingness  of  risk-averse  market-makers  to  provide  liquidity  and  in 
investors’  reactions  to  market  movements,  especially  if they  hold  leveraged  portfolios.  Explanations 
can also relate  to option  trading  strategies  and opportunistic  issuing  patterns  by borrowers  (Borio  and 
McCauley,  1995). No doubt  this is an area that merits  further research. 
3.  Foreign disinvestment 
Unlike  in  the  1987  stock  market  crash  (Aderhold,  Cumming  and  Harwood,  1988), 
international  capital  flows  seem  to have played  a key role in the  1994 turbulence  in the bond  market. 
In particular,  volatility  rose  significantly  in  continental  Europe  as  foreign  investors  liquidated  their 
holdings  of government  bonds. Graph 3 
Stylised  relationship  between  implied  bond  yield  volatility  and 
changes  in  bond  yieids* 
a. No relationship 
c. Semidirectional 
DE:  .43*** 
FR  .6Tc** 
UK: .16*** 
l-E  .43*** 
NL: .32*** 
BE: .w* 
DK  .w** 
AU  .61*** 
b. Symmetric  (adaptive)* 
d. Directional 
Note: AU: Australia;  BE: Belgium; CA: Canada; DK: Denmark  FR: France; DE: Germany;  IT: Italy; 
JP: Japan;  NL: Netherlands;  ES: Spain; SE: Sweden;  UK: United Kingdom;  US: United States. 
’  Coefficient  estimates  of the suitably transformed  weekly  percentage  change in the bond yield (first difference 
in the logs; Friday to Thursday)  in an AR( 1) regression  for implied bond yield volatility.  2 Coefficients  on the 
absolute  value  of the change.  3 Coefficients  on positive  changes only. 
9 The  association  between  foreign  selling  and  volatility  is  quite  striking,  as  can  be  seen  in 
Graph  4.  For  example,  foreign  investors  liquidated  over  DM  13 billion  of their  holdings  of  German 
public  debt  securities  in March  1994, a month  in which  implied  bond  volatility  leapt  by 4 percentage 
points.  Regression  analysis  suggests  that  foreign  liquidation  of bonds  of Fr.fr.  187 billion  in  France, 
DM 39 billion  in  Germany  and Lit.  27 trillion  in Italy  in the  first half  of  19943 raised  implied  bond 
yield  volatility  in these  markets  by  14, 9 and 6 percentage  points  respectively.  These  estimated  effects 
are  not  significantly  tainted  by  any  correlation  between  sales  and  market  movements.  Once 
directionality  is allowed  for, the estimated  coefficients  are very similar4 
In  our  view  the  relationship  between  foreign  sales  and  volatility  reflects  the  greater 
proclivity  among  foreign  investors  to  leverage  their  holdings  of bonds.  As bond  prices  fell,  leveraged 
investors  had to sell, in the same way as shallow-pocketed  equity  investors  receiving  margin  calls. 
Table  2 indicates  the  large  scale  of  leveraged  bond  investment  leading  up  to  1994.  It is 
presumed  that  bond  investments  by  banks  and  securities  firms  can  be  taken  as  a  sign  of  leverage 
Table 2 
Selected  indicators  of leverage  in international  bond markets 
1991  1992  1993  1994 
QI  QII  Qlll  QIV 
in billions  of US dollars 
United  States  ...........................  131  99  76  9  -26  -17  -22 
Commercial  banks’  ..............  111  105  73  17  -6  -20  -18 
Securities  dealers’  ................  20  -6  3  -8  -20  3  -4 
United  Kingdom  .......................  19 
Banks:*  gilts  .........................  -2 
foreign  bonds  ........................  15 
GEMMs:~  gilts  ......................... 
Securities  dealers: 
foreign  bonds  ........................  6 
53  136  -43  -18  0  .. 
6  16  2  0  -1  3 
24  52  -5  -1  7  19 
9  -9  0  -1  . 
23  59  -31  -17  -5  3 
Total  ........................................  150  152  212  -34  -44  -17  .. 
Memorandum  items: 
In  terbank  financed4  ...............  7 
Rep0  tinanced:5  Spain ........... 
Sweden  ...... 
54  182  -54  -48  -1  17 
8  24  -8  -8  -4  -2 
13  -5  -3  -6  2 
l  Treasu  and  agency  securities  for banks  and  including  also  corporate  and  foreign  bonds  for  securities 
dealers.  Y  Including  building  societies.  3  Gilt-edged  market-makers.  4  Cross-border  interbank  domestic 
currency  lending  by  banks  in  Europe  as  an  indicator  of  movements  in  non-residents’  bond  purchases 
hedged  against  exchange  rate  risk.  5  Indicators  of Treasury  bond  purchases  by  non-residents  financed 
through  repos. 
Sources:  National  data  and  BIS. 
3  February  to June for France and Germany; March to July for Italy. 
4  In the case of France  directionality  actually  drops out altogether.  In those  of Germany  and Italy,  at 7 and 5 


















Graph  4 
Bond yield volatility  and bond sales by non-residents  in Germany,  France  and Italy 
Germany 
I 
Left-hand scale (in percentage points): 
_  Change in implied volatility 1 
Right-hand scale (in billions of 
national cuKency): 
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(.so)  I.W 
France 
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-  IVB, x 6.68***  + .07* Purch, + .47*** Sales, + .52*** IVB,_,  -  12,000 
-  8,000 
-  4,000 
’ As defined  in Graph  1.  z Net sales are truncated  at zero. For Germany,  public  sector DM-denominated  bonds;  for France, 
OATS and BTNs;  for Italy,  BTPs. 
Sources: J. P. Morgan  and central  banks. owing  to  the  predomindy  short-term  liabilities  of  these  financial  firms.  The  partial  evidence 
suggests  that banks’ and  securities  firms’ leveraged  positions  were building  up at a rate of  $50  billion 
per  quarter  in  the  conrse  of  1993,  only to Shrink  rapidly  in  the  first  two  quarters  of  1994.  Note 
especially  the  activity  of UK-based  securities  firms,  likely  buyers  and sellers of European  bonds. 
4.  Market  spillovers 
In October  1987 price  changes  in one  market  mimicked  price  changes  in others.  Studies 
of  the  1987  stock  market  crash  have  indeed  documented  substantial  spillovers  of  volatility  across 
markets  (Bennett  and  Kelleher,  1988; Hamao,  Masulis,  and Ng,  1990; King  and  Wadhwani,  1990). 
Such  spillovers  seem  less  a feature  of  the  usual  interrelations  of  global  bond  markets  than  of  global 
stock  markets.  Nevertheless,  in  1994  spillovers  multiplied  to  create  an  interesting  hierarchy  of 
influence. 
In  contrast  to the  two  other  forms  of market  dynamics  just  discussed,  spillovers  cannot 
explain  the  general  rise  in  volatility.  That  is,  the  market’s  decline  and  foreign  disinvestment  can  be 
considered  as (perhaps  unsatisfactory)  prime  movers.  Spillovers  represent  no  more  than  a force  that 
spreads  volatility  around. 
Simple  correlations  show  that  bond  yield  volatility  is  more  closely  related  across 
countries  when  volatility  is  high  (Singleton,  1994).  While  1993  saw  quite  variable  patterns  of 
volatility  within  the  G-3  and  across  Europe,  in  1994’s highly  volatile  markets  volatility  co-varied 
considerably  across borders;  Japan was the exception  (Graph  5). 
Similarly,  lagged  volatility  in  a foreign  market  adds  explanatory  power  to  own  lagged 
volatility  when  the effect  of the latter falters (Graph  6). We find  that  such  spillovers  vary  in size and 
direction  over time.5 They  were sparse before  the US tightening  of monetary  policy  in February  1994, 
with  Frankfurt  and London  each exerting  some  influence  on other  European  markets  (Graph  7). They 
became  much  more  pervasive  thereafter,  when  New  York  broadcast  its volatility  widely  and  London 
appeared  to transmit  its volatility  to continental  Europe  (Graph  8). 
III. The possible explanations: domestic economic factors 
Domestic  economic  factors,  including  the  inflation  record  and  money  market  volatility, 
help  to explain  cross-sectional  differences  in bond  volatility.  They  do not,  however,  offer  much  help 
in  explaining  the  1994  episode.  In  particular,  changes  in  expected  inflation  and  growth  did  not 
correspond  to changes  in volatility. 
The  tests  were  based on AR( 1) regressions  for market  i to which  the previous  week’s volatility  on market j 
was added.  The  picture  presented  here  is a simplified  one.  For  a more  comprehensive  map,  see Borio  and 
McCauley  (1995). 
12 Graph  5 
International  correlations  of implied bond yield volatility  * 
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* The correlation  coefficient  between  weekly  implied  yield  volatilities  is calculated  over a sixteen-week  sliding  window and is 
plotted at the point corresponding  to the last observation. 
Sources:  J. P. Morgan  and BIS calculations. 
1.  Inflation performance  and expectations 
Inflation  performance  and  expectations  set  the  background  level  of  volatility.  For 
evidence,  consider  the US time  series and the cross-section  of European  countries. 
In the  130 years  following  the  Civil  War, the  most  volatile  period  in  US  bond  markets 
was  the  spell  of record-high  rates  fifteen  years  ago  (Wilson,  Sylla  and  Jones,  1990). If  inflationary 
expectations  drive  yields,  then  the  highest  inflation  expectations  in US  history  produced  the  highest 
yield  volatility.  A moving  average  of monthly  yield  volatility  of the  ten-year  bond  peaks  in common 
with yields  early in the  1980s (Graph  9). 
Within  Europe,  lower-inflation  economies  enjoy  generally  less  volatile  bond  markets.  In 
both  1993  and  1994,  the  excess  of  yield  volatility  of  Italian  government  bonds  over  that  of  their 
German  counterparts  more  or  less  matched  the  4 to  5 percentage  point  excess  of  Italian  government 
bond  yields  over German  yields  (Graph  10). If international  differences  in bond  yields  reflect  inflation 
performance  and  expectations  (as filtered  through  exchange  rate expectations),  then  higher  volatility 
joins  higher  yields  as the price  of inflation. 
3 Graph 6 
The explanatory  power  of persistence  and spillovers:  rolling  regressions  * 
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* Uncentred  E2 from (de-meaned)  AR(l)  rolling  regressions  for market i to which the previous  week’s volatility  in market j 
is added. The regressions  are run over a sixteen-week  window. 
2.  Revisions  of inflation  and  growth  expectations 
While  volatility  reflects  long-term  inflation  performance,  changes  in  volatility  in  1994 
bore  little  relation  to market  participants’  revisions  of inflation  expectations.  What  is more,  the  same 
negative  result  holds  in the  case  of  changes  in growth  expectations  (Table  3). True,  some  important 
instances  did  suggest  a relationship;  the  striking  revision  of  estimates  of German  growth  in  the  first 
half  of  1994 is one such  example.  But the relationship  does  not seem  to possess  any generality.  More 
formal  econometric  evidence  supports  this  conclusion  (Borio  and  McCauley,  1995).  We  have  not, 
however,  abandoned  this  relationship  altogether.  We  are  in  the  process  of  investigating  the 
explanatory  power  of  changes  in  the  cross-sectional  dispersion  of  opinion  (Consensus  Economics, 
1992-95). 
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* Volatility  is measured  as the twelve-month  moving  average of the annualised  standard  deviation  of daily percentage 
changes  during  calendar  months. 
Graph  10 
Implied  bond yield volatility  and yields in European  bond markets 
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16 Table 3 
Volatility  of  market  participants’  growth  and  inflation  forecasts 
Growth’  Inflation’ 
19932  19942 
I 
change  19932  19942  change 
United  States  ............ 
Japan  ....................... 
Germany  .................. 
France  ...................... 
Italy  ........................... 
United  Kingdom  ........ 
Canada  ..................... 
Australia  .................... 
Belgium  .................... 
Netherlands  .............. 
Spain  ........................ 
Sweden  .................... 
0.11  0.10  -0.02  0.08  0.03  -0.05 
0.25  0.07  -0.17  0.06  0.06  -6.01 
0.17  0.17  0.06  0.04  0.05  0.01 
0.16  0.06  -0.11  0.10  0.06  -0.04 
0.09  0.14  0.05  0.10  0.06  -0.04 
0.06  0.05  -0.01  0.08  0.15  0.07 
0.06  0.07  0.00  0.06  0.16  0.09 
0.16  0.12  -0.04  0.09  0.10  0.01 
0.15  0.07  -0.08  0.07  0.06  -0.01 
0.12  0.11  0.00  0.07  0.08  0.01 
0.10  0.07  -0.03  0.12  0.08  -0.05 
0.10  0.10  0.06  0.08  0.13  0.05 
in percentage  points 
l  Standard  deviation  of  the  monthly  changes  in  the  forecast  for  average  annual  GDP  growth  and 
consumer  price  inflation  respectively  over two  years.  *  Year in which  forecasts  are made. 
Source:  0  The  Economist,  London  (various  issues), and  BIS calculations. 
Put  differently,  our  evidence  indicates  that  if  expectations  about  inflation  and  output 
growth  played  a role  in the  rise  of volatility  then  this  role  was only  indirect  i.e.  it operated  through 
their  impact  on the  level of yields  and hence  through  one  of the  identified  market  dynamics.  Whether 
the  sharp  increase  in bond  yields  last year  was  itself  fully  explicable  in  terms  of  fundamentals  is  a 
question  not addressed  here, but one about which  some doubts  remain  (BIS (1995)). 
3.  Money market  volatility 
In the  cross-section,  money  market  volatility  was associated  with  bond  market  volatility 
across  a  dozen  markets  in  1994 (Graph  11). We  measure  money  market  volatility  as  the  standard 
deviation  of  the  daily  percentage  change  in  three-month  LIBOR  three  months  forward  in  order  to 
avoid  the very close control  of the central bank over the shortest  rates. 
On  the  basis  of  the  time  series,  we  find  evidence  of  a  relationship  between  reafised 
money  volatility  and implied  bond  volatility  in almost  all of the markets  considered.  The relationship 
in Tokyo  is clearly  apparent,  especially  in January  1994, when  the rise in bond  yield  volatility  echoed 
instability  in the money  market  (Graph  12). 
For seven  of the thirteen  markets,  money  and bond  market  volatility  co-vary  significantly 
at  the  weekly  frequency  (Table  4).  In  the  United  States,  Germany,  the  United  Kingdom,  the 
Netherlands,  Spain,  Denmark  and  Sweden,  1 or  2%  of  (Friday  through  Thursday’s)  money  market 
volatility  shows  up in the respective  Thursday  close bond  volatilities. Graph  11 
Implied  bond  yield  volatility:  relationship  with  money  market  volatility 
1  1 
0 
,  # 
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* Annualised  standard  deviation  of the daily percentage  change  in the yield on three-month  LIBOR  three months  fans sir,. 
monthly  average  for  1994. The measure avoids the direct  influence  of the authorities  on spot short-term  rates and is the::i;y 
a better indicator  of market expectations. 
Sources:  J. P. Morgan,  national  authorities  and BIS. 
Graph  12 
Implied  bond  yield  vqlatility  and  historical  money  market  volatility  in Japan 
In  percentages 
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* Annualised  weekly  volatility,  calculated  over a one-week  window,  with an imposed zero mean;  nine-week  moving  average. 
Sources: J. P. Morgan  and national  authorities. Table 4 
Implied  bond yield volatility  and realised money market  volatility:  regression  results’ 
United  States  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 
Japan  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 
Germany  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 
France  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 
Italy  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 
United  Kingdom  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 
Canada  .  .  ,  .  .  .  . .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 
Belgium  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 
Netherlands  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 
Spain  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 
Denmark4  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 
Sweden4  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 
Australia4  .  .  .  .  . .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 
Weekly  Monthly* 
Whole  Earlier  Later  Whole  Earlier  Later 
sample  period  period  sample  period  period 
0.012”  0.005  O-01  8*  0.006  -0.027  0.036 
(0.005)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.024)  (0.029)  (0.040) 
0.004  0.018  XI.005  0.066”  0.041-  0.095’ 
(0.007)  (0.011)  (0.008)  (0.019)  0.014  (0.053) 
0.02Y  0.010  0.032”  0.006  0.032  -0.046 
(0.010)  (0.008)  {0.015)  (0.059)  (0.062)  (0.107) 
0.005  0.004  0.010  0.030”  0.118*’ 
(0.005)  (0.005)  (0.012)  ;:z;  (0.012)  (0.052) 
0.011  0.011  0.017”  0.008  0.005  0.030 
(0.010)  (0,015)  (0.009)  (0.011)  (0.014)  (0.052) 
0.009*  0.011*  0.015  0.004  0.006  0.038 
(0.005)  (0.005)  (0.017)  (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.110) 
0.004  0.009’  0.001  0.004  -0.008 
(0.003)  (0.005)  (0.002)  (0.010)  -(Z::)  (0.012) 
-0.003  0.004  -0.012  0.0253  0.008  0.062” 
(0.006)  (0.003)  (0.010)  (0.015)  (0.006)  0.014 
0.017-  0.001  0.054” 
(KZ) 
-0.004  0.053 
(0.006)  (0.004)  (0.017)  (0.016)  (0.084) 
0.006  0.003  0.018  0.037  0.017 
(0.006)  (0.010)  (0.016)  (0.026)  (0.025) 
0.020*  0.063 
(0.011)  (0.057) 
0.023”  0.070** 
(0.009)  (0.031) 
0.009  0.049 
(0.008)  (0.029) 
Japan  (period  split 
at end-l  993) .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  0.004  0.004  0.003  0.066” 
;:K; 
0.090’” 
(0.007)  (0.007)  (0.010)  (0.019)  (0.029) 
1  The  table  shows  the  coefficient  of money  market  volatility  in an AR(l)  regression  for  implied  bond  yield 
volatility.  The  data  are  weekly.  Money  market  volatility  is measured  as  the  standard  deviation  (around  an 
imposed  zero  mean)  of  the  implied  three-month  UBOR  three  months  forward  calculated  over  non- 
overlapping  one-week  horizons  (Friday  to  Thursday).  Standard  errors  are  shown  in  brackets.  Blanks 
indicate  missing  data.  *  Month-average  data.  3  Marginal  significance  level  equal  to  10.06%.  4  Data 
are missing  for earlier  period.  See Table  1. 
More  volatile  money  markets  tend to show a significant  influence  on the respective  bond 
markets  only  at the  monthly  frequency  (same table).  In Japan,  France,  Belgium  and Australia,  money 
market  volatility  shows  a generally  stronger  effect on bond  volatility. 
The  link  between  money  market  and bond  market  volatility  seems  to  have  strengthened 
in  1994. For instance,  in the United  States there was no significant  transmission  of volatility  along  the 
yield  curve  before  February  1994, but  thereafter  2%  of  money  market  volatility  appeared  in  bond 
volatility. The  tightening  of  the  relationship  between  money  and  bond  volatility  becomes  evident 
when  US  implied,  rather  than  reulised,  money  volatility  is juxtaposed  to  implied  bond  volatility 
(Graph  13). Moreover,  with  the  benefit  of  these  data,  the  transmission  of  volatility  gains  strength, 
from  l-2%  to some  5% over the  whole  period  and  to  20%  after  February  1994. This  result  suggests 
that our crude measure  of realised  weekly  money  volatility  may  understate  volatility  transmission  by a 
factor of 4 or 5 over the whole  sample.6 
Graph 13 
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* Derived  from three-year  caps on three-month  LIBOR. 
Sources:  Chase Manhattan,  J. P. Morgan  and the Federal Reserve Board. 
On balance,  international  differences  in money  market  volatility  of 40 percentage  points 
or more  suggest  a fairly  weighty  role for this  factor in the  cross-sectional  analysis.  But even our high 
estimates  of  volatility  transmission  along  the  yield  curve  point  to  only  a  modest  role  for  money 
6  In  Borio  and  McCauley  (1995)  an  additional  econometric  procedure  is  used  to  quantify  this  bias.  The 
estimates  indicate  that  the  adjustment  typically  varies  between  2 and  5 across  countries. market  volatility  in making  sense  of the  turbulence  of bond  markets  in  1994.’ In fact, in a number  of 
countries,  money  markets  were actually  more  stable in  1994 than in 1993. And  for the countries  where 
both  money  and bond  market  volatility  rose  in  1994, the increase  in money  volatility  was too  modest 
to explain  much  of the rise in bond  volatility. 
4.  Fiscal policy uncertainty 
We are able to measure  the variation  in market  participants’  views  about  fiscal policy  at a 
high  frequency  only  for one country.  Italy’s government  debt is so large that movements  in the  spread 
between  government  and private  fixed-rate  borrowing  costs  largely  reflect  changing  judgments  about 
fiscal  policy.  In  other  markets,  they  mirror  primarily  movements  in  private  sector  default  risk,  and 
hence  the  business  cycle,  as well  as  other  specific  demand  and  supply  factors.  In  fact,  in  Italy  the 
configuration  of private  and public  debt rates is unique  in favouring  private  debtors.  The best  of these 
can  raise  long-term  funds  on better  terms  than  those  enjoyed  by  the  Italian  government  (Giovannini 
and Piga,  1992; Banca d’Italia, 1995). 
At  times  the  rise  in  Italian  government  yields  and  the  associated  increase  in  volatility 
seem  to  have  reflected  the  deterioration  in  the  government’s  credit  standing.  Yields  on  Italian 
government  bonds  rose  in relation  to the  cost  of private  debt  in the  summer  of  1994, when  investors’ 
hopes  for  a businesslike  budget  process  waned,  and  again  in  March  1995,  when  events  in  Mexico 
turned  investors  against  financing  unsustainable  debts, whether  domestic  or external (Graph  14). 
Regression  analysis  suggests  that in Italy a 10 basis point  widening  of the spread between 
public  and private  debt costs pushes  up implied  bond  yield  volatility  by a third  of a percentage  point. 
Accordingly,  the  widening  of the  swap  spread  in the  late summer  of  1994 would  account  for around 
2 percentage  points  of the rise in volatility  during  that period.8 
This  widely  appreciated  but  hitherto  unquantified  impulse  to Italian bond  yield  volatility 
has  no  obvious  parallel  in  other  counties.  Until  some  such  evidence  is  found  for  the  other  dozen 
markets  considered,  we  must  provisionally  judge  the  role  of  fiscal  uncertainty  in  1994’s bond  market 
turbulence  to be  specific  to one  market  rather  than  a general  factor. 
7  Moreover,  the causal link may even have  run from bond to money  market  volatility.  As leveraged  investors 
unwound  their  holdings  of bonds,  the  reduction  in their  demand  for  short-term  funds may  have  disturbed 
money  markets. 
*  The  preferred  equation  included  only  positive  changes  in the swap spread  (ASP+)  and positive  percentage 
changes  in the  swap rate  (ARW+, approximated  by the  first difference  in the logs)  as controlling  variable. 
Asymmetries  are again at work: 
IVB,  =2.76***+2.92*ASP+  +0.44***hRw’+0.80***1VB,_, 
(0.65)  (1.54)  (0.11)  (0.04) Graph 14 
Government  bond yield and swap  rate in Italy 
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* Difference  between  the  ten-year  benchmark  government  bond  yield  and  the  ten-year  swap  rate. 
Sources:  Datastream  and  Reuter. 
Conclusions 
The  observation  that  the  highest  volatility  ever  recorded  in  US  bond  markets  occurred 
fifteen  years  ago  cautions  against  many  popular  conceptions.  The  highest  volatility  did  not  require 
developed  markets  for  bond  futures  and  options,  new  forms  of  leveraged  investment  or  even  a 
substantial  presence  of foreign  investors. 
That  said,  in  the  bond  market  turbulence  of  1994 we  find  more  evidence  of  the  bond 
market’s  own  dynamics  at  work  than  of  measurable  uncertainty  regarding  fundamental 
macroeconomic  and financial  factors. 
Let  us step back and compare  the  1994 bond  market  decline  with  the  1987 stock  market 
crash. Obviously,  the bond  market  decline  was a more  diffuse  and less global  event. The notion  that at 
least some  markets  were overvalued  is probably  more  widely  accepted  for the  1987 stock market  crash 
than  for the  1994 bond market  decline  (Hardouvelis,  1988; Bank  for International  Settlements,  1995). 
In terms  of the market  dynamics  which  we have emphasised,  both  incidents  reinforce  the 
connection  between  bear  markets  and  high  volatility.  An  interesting  question  might  be  whether  the 
22 stock market  returned  to normal  volatility  faster than did global  bond  markets  in  1994. Both  incidents 
saw an intensification  of spillovers  and  a broadening  of their  geographical  scope.  But the  importance 
of  foreign  disinvestment  distinguishes  the  1994 bond  market  decline  from  the  1987 crash,  and  this 
may  make  it  more  modem.  Similarly,  foreign  investors’  extensive  use  of  leverage  sets  the  1994 
episode  apart from the crash of  1987, when  leverage  remained  a domestic  phenomenon. 
The  role  of  fundamentals  in  the  two  cases  remains  problematic.  In  1987  observers 
vaguely  pointed  to  the  effect  of  interest  rate  volatility,  including  that  associated  with  Japanese 
disinvestment  in US bonds,  to  frictions  between  the  US  and German  authorities  and to other  factors. 
For our part, we have had little success  in linking  revisions  of growth  and inflation  expectations  to the 
pattern  of increases  in bond yield  volatility  last year. And  there is just  a little weight  to be given  to the 
view  that increased  uncertainty  regarding  monetary  policy  drove  up bond  volatility. References 
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